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ALUMARTICLES
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NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULING AFFECT
SECONDARY INFRINGEMENT IN THE
OUTER REACHES OF CYBERSPACE?
Michael S. Elkin*
Alexandra Khlyavich*"
I. INTRODUCTION
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in large part, upheld the preliminary in-
junction against Napster, Inc. ("Napster') based on its finding
that Napster is likely to be proven a contributory and vicarious
infringer2 of the rights of copyright holders in sound recordings
* Partner, Thelen Reid & Priest LLP, and Chairman of the firm's Enter-
tainment Practice Group. Facult6 des Lettres, L'Universit6 de Tours (1978);
A.B., Rutgers University (1979); M.S.W., Rutgers University (1981); J.D.,
Brooklyn Law School (1984). On behalf of recording industry clients, Mr.
Elkin has successfully led litigation teams in actions against MP3.com, Inc.,
Napster, Inc. and Musicmaker.com, Inc. While at Brooklyn Law School, Mr.
Elkin served as Executive Comments Editor of the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law, and authored a comment, Industrial Investment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.: An Application of the Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of
the United States Antitrust Laws, 9 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 115 (1983).
** Associate, Thelen Reid & Priest LLP, in the firm's Commercial Litiga-
tion department. B.A., Pennsylvania State University (1992); J.D., Fordham
Law School (1999). The author has worked closely with Mr. Elkin as a mem-
ber of the litigation teams that represented clients against MP3.com, Inc. and
Napster, Inc.
1. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter Napster Il].
2. Contributory and vicarious infringement is actionable under the Copy-
right Act of 1976 which grants the owners of copyrights the exclusive rights
"to do and to authorize" the reproduction and distribution of their works.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) [hereinafter CA]; Gershwin
BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXVII:2
and musical compositions. ' In the wake of the Ninth Circuit's
decision, new Napster-like file-trading services remain unde-
terred. The rapid transfer of songs on the Internet is made
possible through digital MP3 technology.4 Copying or "ripping"
audio compact disks directly onto a computer's hard drive in
the compressed MP3 format allows users of Napster (and vir-
tually all other music-swapping services on the Internet) to
store and rapidly transfer or transmit the copied music from
one computer to another.5 Yet, even as Napster struggles to
6gain legal legitimacy, new applications are surfacing to per-
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971); GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.
Supp. 763, 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
3. As of the date of this writing, members of the House of Representa-
tives are urging the adoption of the Music Online Competition Act, which
would amend copyright law to extend the same protection to legitimate on-
line music distributors as exists for radio, cable and satellite broadcasters.
H.R. 2724, 107th Cong. (2001). See also Brian Krebs, Key House Leaders
Lobby to Defeat Digital Music Bill, NEWSBYTES (Sept. 20, 2001), at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/170343.html.
4. MP3 stands for MPEG-3, a standard file format for storage of audio
recording in a digital form set by the Moving Picture Experts Group. See
Napster 11, 239 F.3d at 1011. Songs copied in MP3 format are virtually indis-
tinguishable to the human ear from the original recordings. See UMG Re-
cordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Aaron M. Bai-
ley, A Nation of Felons?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 473, 479 n.30 (2000).
5. SeeNapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1011.
6. See Brad King, Napster's New Tune: Pay Labels, WIRED NEWS (Sept. 7,
2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,46636,00.html. Not only
has Napster acquired security technology to aid it in operating lawfully, it
has licensed that technology to BeMusic, Inc., ("BeMusic") the operator of the
record club BMG Music Service, CDNow, an on-line music retailer, and My-
play, Inc., a music locker. See Kevin Featherly, Napster Licenses Security
Tech to Bertelsmann's BeMusic, NEWSBYTES (Oct. 23, 2001), at
http://www.newsbytes.com. BeMusic is owned by Bertelsmann AG
("Bertelsmann"), a German company that controls the recording label giant
BMG Recorded Music ("BMG"), one of Napster's former legal pursuers. See
id.
Indeed, all the major traditional record labels that pursued Napster in
front of Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel are developing their own legitimate,
on-line music services. For instance, Vivendi Universal S.A.'s Universal Mu-
sic Group, and Sony Corporation's Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., who
joined to create the on-line music venture PressPlay, struck deals with six
independent record labels to enhance the on-line music selection they will be
offering from their own labels as well as from EMI Group Plc.'s EMI labels
("EMI"). See Reuters, PressPlay in License Deals with 6 Record Labels,
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form much the same function. For example, FastTrack, Audio-
galaxy, iMesh and Gnutella were used to download 3.05 billion
music, movie and software files during the month of August
2001 alone.7
HINDusTAN TIMES (Oct. 18, 2001), at http://www.hindustantimes.com. Access
to music on PressPlay will be offered through, among others, MP3.com, Inc.
("MP3.com'). See id. The other major labels, AOL Time Warner, Inc.,
Bertesmann and EMI, are backing an on-line music subscription service
called MusicNet.com. See Dick Kelsey, Groups Seek Support For Online Mu-
sic Law, NEwSBYrES (Oct. 17, 2001) at http'//www.newsbytes.com.
Warner Music Group has also announced a licensing deal with Echo
Networks, a privately held "stand-alone" on-line music provider based in San
Francisco. See Reuters, Warner Music and Echo Networks in Licensing Deal
(Nov. 5, 2001), available at http:J/www.lawtomation.com/news/mp3news/
mp3110501.html. Ironically, it appears that the United States Justice De-
partment is conducting an investigation into the major record companies'
plans for fear that they may prevent fair competition in the market. See
Download Sites Face More Scrutiny, BBC NEws (Oct. 16, 2001), at
http'//news.bbc.co.uk. Members of the European Union have expressed simi-
lar concerns at a conference in Brussels in October 2001. See EU 'Threat'
Over Download Sites, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2001), at http'//news.bbc.co.uk.
On February 22, 2002, Chief Judge Patel ruled that not only do the
record companies have to prove that they own the music at issue, they must
also show that the copyrights were not used to monopolize the distribution of
digital music. See Brad King, Judge: If You Own Music, Prove It, WIRED
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2002), at http://www.wired.com [hereinafter If You Own Mu-
sic]. The record companies have three weeks to comply with Chief Judge
Patel's order. Id. A hearing on the anti-competitive allegations against the
record companies has been set for March 27, 2002. See John Borland, Nap-
ster Court Win Puts Labels in Spotlight, CNET NEws.coM (Feb. 22, 2002), at
http/www.news.com [hereinafter Napster Court Win]. This ruling does not
affect either Chief Judge Patel's or the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Napster's
own culpable behavior. Rather, if plaintiffs cannot prove that they own the
copyrights at issue, they will have failed to prove a prima facie case of direct
infringement of their copyrights. There is no doubt, however, that someone's
copyrights have been infringed.
7. Napster Eclipsed by Newcomers, WIRED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2001), at
http-/www.wired.com. See also Reuters, Music Downloading Rises in August,
Topping Napster (Sept. 6, 2001), available at
http'//www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/reutrs-wire/14650381.htm; John
Borland, Rocky Financial Road Awaits File Swappers, CNET NEwS.coM
(Sept. 21, 2001), at http'//news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-7230930.html ("Al-
ready, millions of people have migrated to start-ups such as [MusicCity.com,
Inc. ("MusicCity")], Audiogalaxy and Aimster.") [hereinafter Rocky Road];
Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit Is Sick of Hearing Napster Tune, RECORDER (Sept.
20, 2001), at http://www.law.com (noting that on September 18, 2001, seven
of the top eleven downloaded programs available at CNET Download.com,
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The fact that file-trading services are burgeoning implies
that the Napster decision will serve as an important precedent
in copyright infringement cases set in cyberspace.' Coupled
with the truly global scope of the Internet, the question of how
Napster will impact copyright cases against infringers in this
country, but particularly abroad, is ripe for examination!9
The Ninth Circuit in Napster held that "if a computer system
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his
system and fails to purge such material from the system, the
operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement."0
Further, the court found that Napster "provides 'the site and
http://download.cnet.com, enabled file-sharing and were available for
downloading at no charge).
Most recently, Wired.com reported a Webnoise study which predicted
that FastTrack would surpass Napster's volume and use by the end of No-
vember 2001. See Brad King, EMI Has No Fears of Peers, WIRED NEws (Nov.
6, 2001), at http://wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,48147,00.html [hereinafter
EMI Has No Fears]. The same article reported a business arrangement in a
related industry, the distribution of on-line videos, between strange bedfel-
lows - EMI, Jive Media Technology and Gnutella software developer Live
Wire - that has made it possible for viewers to search and download videos
off the Internet. See id.
8. Indeed the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") and
the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") have initiated litigation
against newer peer-to-peer services, MusicCity, Kazaa and Grokster, Ltd.
("Grokster") for secondary copyright infringement liability. See Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 01-8541 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2,
2001) (against Grokster, MusicCity, MusicCity Networks, Inc. and Consumer
Empowerment BV); John Paczkowski, Good Morning Silicon Valley, SILICON
VALLEY.COM (Mar. 14, 2001), at http://www.siliconvalley.comldocs/ opin-
ion/gmsv/archiveOlmornlOO32001.htm (reporting that the RIAA and MPAA
were contemplating filing law suits).
9. Indeed, among the multitude of discussions exploring this timely sub-
ject, the Bureau of Nhtion Affairs' Third Annual Public Policy Forum on In-
ternational E-Commerce & Internet Regulation, hosted in part by Pike &
Fisher, Inc., on November 14, 2001, was devoted to the topic of what legal
challenges businesses face in operating on the Internet. Letter from U. Jo-
seph Hecker, President, Pike & Fisher, Inc., to Colleagues Attending the
Third Annual Forum (Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with Journal). The discussion
focused on international jurisdiction and cross-border infringement and pi-
racy." Id.
10. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021.
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facilities' for direct infringement," and that it therefore "mate-
rially contributed to the direct infringement."1
Read broadly, Napster provides precedent for courts to hold
all service providers, including foreign providers, who have
reason to know that their software or website is being used for
infringing purposes, liable to copyright holders for contributory
infringement. 12 But will the Napster holding reach foreign con-
tributory infringers? In holding Napster liable, did the Ninth
Circuit provide the perfect precedent for holding a foreign com-
pany whose software is available on the Internet liable to a
United States copyright holder for contributory infringement?
This Article will first study the Napster decision, concentrat-
ing in Section II on the Ninth Circuit's factual findings and its
contributory infringement analysis. Then, in Section III, with
the aid of a hypothetical in which a contributory infringement
case is brought in a U.S. federal court by a U.S. copyright
holder against a foreign Napster-like service provider, this Ar-
ticle will attempt to discern the likely outcome of such a dis-
pute. The hypothetical will focus on the likely jurisdictional
analysis a court would undertake, in the context of cyberspace,
to determine whether a foreign defendant may indeed be held
liable in a foreign forum for an act that may (or may not) be
permitted under the defendant's sovereign's jurisprudence. 3
11. Id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
264 (9th Cir. 1996).
12. The tort of contributory infringement is well developed in American
jurisprudence. This is not so in other countries, such as Canada, where a
cause of action for contributory infringement does not lie. See MICHAEL A.
GEIST, INTERNET LAW IN CANADA 472-525 (2d ed. 2000) (no contributory in-
fringement under Canadian law). Other differences, for example, include
Europe, where copyright owners enjoy "moral rights" in their works. See, e.g.,
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1146 (2000).
13. Consideration of this topic will inevitably spur the pragmatic question
of whether, having cleared the pertinent procedural and substantive hurdles,
a U.S. judgment would be enforced abroad. This is especially true in light of
the well-acknowledged dearth of international treaties on the issue of en-
forcement of judgments - particularly in the context of intellectual property
disputes in cyberspace. For example, the disparateness of Internet 'E-
commerce" law, which broadly covers companies like Napster, is evidenced by
the inability of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters ("Convention on Jurisdiction") to arrive at a
treaty which facilitates the enforcement of civil judgments across borders.
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The hypothetical will also show that the liability analysis
courts must undertake to determine whether one may be ad-
judged a contributory infringer complements the jurisdictional
analysis such that, in most cases, the finding of jurisdiction will
lead directly to a finding of liability. Finally, given the factual
predicate under which Napster was decided, Section IV con-
cludes that Napster-like services, no-matter where they are
based, must beware.
Andy Sullivan, Global E-Commerce Treaty Hits Snag, INFO-SEC.COM (Feb. 2,
2001), at http://www.info-sec.comcommerce/01/commerce_022101aj.shtml.
See also Proposed Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, at http://www.cptech.orglecom/
jurisdiction/hague.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002). Formed in 1996, the
Convention on Jurisdiction "has been hung up since 1999 over a disagree-
ment over how business-consumer disputes should be settled." See Sullivan,
supra note 13.
Though copyright issues are not necessarily inherent in e-commerce,
the stumbling blocks to achieving a comprehensive treaty on the enforcement
of judgments share many of the same characteristics with copyright law. By
way of example, the key area of disagreement appears to be over jurisdic-
tional issues, i.e., the current draft of the Convention on Jurisdiction makes it
unnecessary for aggrieved consumers to file suit outside of their own home
countries. Id. This important topic is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
interesting criticism of the standards currently in place and the initiatives
that have developed and stalled, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to
the Intellectual Property Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 421 (2001) (discussing the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"), the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") and proposed Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law Convention on Jurisdiction and the Rec-
ognition of Foreign Judgments). See also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copy-
right Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 469 (2000) (exploring, among other topics, provisions of Berne Con-
vention, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") and TRIPS);
Michael J. O'Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copyright
Holders in the Internet Age, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing WIPO,
the Berne Convention, TRIPS, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty). TRIPS requires member countries of
the World Trade Organization to comport their copyright laws with the sub-
stantive provisions of the Berne Convention. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
From the Dead Sea Scrolls to the Digital Millennium: Recent Developments in
Copyright Law, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 19, 61 (2000).
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II. A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.
Until it was enjoined from operating, Napster was a popular
music-sharing program created by a college student named
Shawn Fanning as a favor to a friend who wanted to find ob-
scure rap music on the Internet. 4 The Napster program Fan-
ning created collected the names of the MP3 files on all of its
users' computers in a searchable index, so that users could as-
certain the songs available for copying through Napster and
select the songs they wished to download onto their own com-
puters from that list.'5 The actual transfers of files took place
between users so that no copies were made or retained on Nap-
ster's servers. 6 Undoubtedly recognizing that Napster would
not be found liable for direct copyright infringement because it
did not itself engage in the copying of their copyrighted music,
under the auspices of the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA"), eighteen major record companies filed a
complaint against Napster for contributory and vicarious in-
fringement."8
On July 26, 2000, having found that plaintiffs had estab-
lished a likelihood of success on their contributory and vicari-
ous infringement claims against Napster, 9 Chief Judge
Marilyn Patel of the District Court for the Northern District of
California issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Napster
"from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, download-
ing, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copy-
righted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected
by either federal or state law, without express permission of
the rights owner." ' ° Seven months later, having accepted juris-
14. See Sarah D. Glasebrook, Comment, "Sharing's Only Fun When It's
Not Your Stuff': Napster.com Pushes the Envelope of Indirect Copyright In-
fringement, 69 UMKC L. REV. 811, 811-12 (2001).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24
COLuM. V-LA J.L. & ARTS 1, 28 (2000) ("[Tlhere is no basis for a primary
infringement claim against Napster. Napster does not store files on its serv-
ers. Nor does Napster itself effect the distribution of copies .. ").
18. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal.
2000) [hereinafter Napster 11.
19. Id. at 925.
20. Id. at 927. This written opinion, slightly modifying the injunction, was
issued on August 10, 2000.
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diction to review Chief Judge Patel's interlocutory order,2' the
Ninth Circuit in part vacated the preliminary injunction but let
stand most of Chief Judge Patel's conclusions of law regarding
Napster's likely liability.22 The Ninth Circuit's analysis of Nap-
ster's liability for the peer-to-peer file sharing it facilitated de-
fines the boundaries of secondary infringement liability vis-A-
vis the Internet in the United States. When other Internet
music providers such as Napster are hauled into court here,
this is the case to which plaintiffs will cite.
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing Chief Judge Patel's ruling for a
possible abuse of discretion, found that through its MusicShare
software:
Napster allowed its users to: (1) make MP3 music files stored
on individual computer hard drives available for copying by
other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on
other users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the
contents of other users' MP3 files from one computer to an-
other via the Internet.23
Napster was able to provide this service in part through the
creation of a "search index," maintained on Napster's servers,
which allowed users to access a collective directory of all the
names of the songs Napster users stored on their own individ-
ual computers.24 Provided the host (the user whose songs an-
other user wanted to access) was logged on at the same time as
the requesting user, Napster's software provided the means by
which music could be transferred from one hard drive to an-
other, or "peer-to-peer."
25
In order to prove their case for a preliminary injunction,
plaintiffs first had to present a prima facie case that the peers
were themselves engaging in direct infringement. Therefore,
plaintiffs had to and did demonstrate that they both owned the
works at issue and that at least one exclusive right granted to
21. The Ninth Circuit heard the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(1994). See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
22. See generally Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1004.
23. Id. at 1011.
24. See id. at 1012.
25. Id.
[Vol. XXVII:2
JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE
copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 10626 was violated.27  It is
important to note that the rights under which plaintiffs sued
are derived from the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act"). 28
Had the copyrights been foreign, the analysis of the Ninth Cir-
cuit would have been much more complicated and exhaustive.29
Having found that plaintiffs established the direct infringe-
ment, the Ninth Circuit went on to review Chief Judge Patel's
ruling that plaintiffs established their right to a preliminary
26. Section 106 grants six exclusive rights to owners of copyrights, includ-
ing the right to reproduce and distribute their works. See CA, 17 U.S.C. §106
(1)-(6) (2000). Here the court found the plaintiffs' exclusive rights to repro-
duction and distribution were violated. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014 ("Nap-
ster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate
plaintiffs' distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing
copyrighted music violate plaintiffs reproduction rights."). In what one re-
porter called "a stunning turnaround," the record companies' ownership of
the copyrights at issue has now been called into question. If You Own Music,
supra note 6. Chief Judge Patel ruled on February 22, 2002 that plaintiffs
were obliged to prove their ownership of the copyrights infringed. In re Nap-
ster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. 00-1369 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002) (order
granting defendant's motion for additional discovery), available at
http'/www.cand.uscourts.gov. See also Napster Court Win, supra note 6.
27. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1013. In finding that direct infringement was
indeed taking place, the court examined Napster's affirmative defense of "fair
use." Id. at 1014. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides that fair use of a copyrighted work
is not infringement. Section 107 also sets out factors to help courts deter-
mine whether defendanfs activities constitute fair use:
(1) [Ihe purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the
work used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use on the potential markets [for the work or on the
work's value].
CA, 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Ninth Circuit rejected Napster's arguments on
these traditional fair use factors, and went on to uphold Chief Judge Patel's
rejection of Napster's novel argument that its users' copying of plaintiffs
works was not infringement because they downloaded the works to sample
them - to decide whether to buy the albums. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018.
The Ninth Circuit also upheld Chief Judge Patel's finding that "space-
shifting," the downloading of music already owned by the user, is not fair use.
See id. at 1019. The fair use doctrine will undoubtedly be applied in many
creative new ways in attempts to thwart liability. This topic is deserving of
its own plenary treatment and will not be explored further here.
28. CA, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
29. See infra note 59 (discussing choice of law issues).
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injunction by demonstrating that Napster was a contributory
infringer. °
A. Contributory Infringement
In order to establish that Napster would likely be found li-
able for contributory infringement, plaintiffs had to establish
that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infring-
ing activities, and that Napster materially contributed to its
users' infringing activity.3' The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
district court that "Napster had both actual and constructive
knowledge of direct infringement."32 However, the court of ap-
peals appears to have differed with Chief Judge Patel's conclu-
sion that Napster need not have known of "specific acts of in-
fringement" to satisfy this prong.33 Citing Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.," the
Ninth Circuit held that "absent any specific information which
identified infringing activity, a computer system operator can-
not be liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material."3'5 Perhaps inconsistently, in rejecting Napster's ar-
gument that it was saved from liability under the Sony doc-
trine,36 the Ninth Circuit found that "[r] egardless of the number
30. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019-23.
31. Id. at 1019-20.
32. Id. at 1020.
33. Chief Judge Patel held that "[tihe law does not require actual knowl-
edge of specific acts of infringement." Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
34. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
35. Napster 11, 239 F.3d at 1021.
36. In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the
Supreme Court refused to impute knowledge of infringing activities to defen-
dants where defendants' products were capable of "substantial noninfringing
uses." 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (articulating the "Betamax" standard for con-
tributory infringement). Rather, the Sony Court required proof that defen-
dants in fact had knowledge, either constructive or actual. Id. This decision
carves out an exception from liability in cases where a "staple Article of com-
merce" is capable of substantial non-infringing activity. Id. The Betamax
defense may be used by MusicCity, Grokster and Kazaa to defend against the
RIAA and the MPAA in their recently filed suit for infringement against the
peer-to-peers. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., No. 01-8541
(C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2, 2001); John Borland, File-Swapping Case May Break
390 [Vol. XXVII:2
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of Napster's infringing versus-noninfringing uses, the eviden-
tiary record here supported the district court's finding that
plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster
knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement of plain-
tiffs' copyrights." 7 In this way, the Ninth Circuit indirectly
addressed the district court's observation that the "Betamax"
standard38 was inapplicable because unlike in Sony, where the
manufacturer of the VCRs had no control over the product once
it was in the marketplace, Napster continued to exercise ongo-
ing control over its service."
Significantly, however, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that it
would "not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster
merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be
used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights .... [Contributory in-
fringement will not be found] merely because the structure of
the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material."40
Therefore, the appellate court placed heavy emphasis on ac-
tual, rather than constructive, knowledge.4
New Ground, CNET NEws.coM (Nov. 6, 2001), at http'/news/cnet.com/
news/01005-200-7798704.html (stating that the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, which will represent the defendants, will likely argue that the allegedly
infringing software, which helps users develop file-sharing networks on their
own, is capable of non-infringing uses, and that, because defendants have no
control over how their software is used, they are analogous to the video cas-
sette recorder ("VCR") distributors who were let off the hook by the Supreme
Court in Sony).
37. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021 (requiring that a defendant be notified of
"specific acts of infringement," seems to remove the having "reason to know"
possibility from the inquiry).
38. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
39. NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
40. NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1020-21.
41. This holding is in line with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 10 and scattered sections), which codified the requirement of
knowledge or "volition" for liability for contributory infringement. See Bailey,
supra note 4, at 502-03 (noting that the DMCA essentially codifies the hold-
ing in Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communications Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995), namely, that an Internet service
provider ("ISP") could not be liable for contributory infringement where it
had no knowledge, nor could it know that infringing material was posted on
its system). The DMCA is Congress' attempt to conform U.S. copyright law to
WIPO treaties.
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As for the second prong of the test, the district court, follow-
ing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.42 found that "Napster,
Inc. supplies the proprietary software, search engine, servers,
and means of establishing a connection between users' com-
puters. Without the support services defendant provides, Nap-
ster users could not find and download the music they want
with the ease of which defendant boasts." 3 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court that Napster "materially contrib-
uted" to the infringing activity by providing "'the site and facili-
ties' for direct infringement."4'
B. Vicarious Infringement45
Vicarious infringement liability, an outgrowth of the respon-
deat superior doctrine, "extends beyond an employer/employee
relationship" to situations in which the defendant "'has the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also
has a direct financial interest in such activities."'4 The Ninth
Circuit upheld Chief Judge Patel's finding that, as to economic
interest in the direct infringing activity, "[almple evidence sup-
ports the district court's finding that Napster's future revenue
is directly dependent upon 'increases in userbase."'' 7 It also
upheld the district court's conclusion as to the supervision
prong of the test, but with a caveat. "The ability to block in-
fringers' access to a particular environment for any reason
whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise.
"48
The district court found that Napster may be liable for vicari-
ous infringement because Napster expressly reserved its rights
42. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
43. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
44. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022.
45. The Ninth Circuit's vicarious liability analysis is not discussed in this
Article in great detail. As the brief discussion that follows demonstrates,
both the district court and the appellate court placed much emphasis on Nap-
ster's express reservation of rights to police its site. As a practical matter,
the Napster decisions broadcast a way in which future defendants may es-
cape vicarious liability by structuring their systems such that they are un-
able to police their sites. In any event, the Ninth Circuit's upholding of the
district court's findings as to vicarious liability appears to have been half-
hearted.
46. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262).
47. Id. at 1023.
48. Id.
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to refuse service or terminate accounts for any reason, but
failed to police its service." According to the Ninth Circuit,
however, the lower court "failed to recognize that the bounda-
ries of the premises that Napster 'controls and patrols' are lim-
ited" by its architecture. ° Nonetheless, that the search indexes
were "within the 'premises' that Napster has the ability to po-
lice," combined with Napster's financial benefit from the in-
fringing activity, was enough to lead to the imposition of vicari-
ous liability.5'
After addressing Napster's remaining arguments in its de-
fense,52 the Ninth Circuit proceeded to direct the district court
to modify the injunction against Napster to place the burden on
plaintiffs to inform Napster of the availability of their copy-
righted works on the Napster system.53 Subsequently, on
March 5, 2001, Chief Judge Patel modified the injunction
against Napster.5 4 Not surprisingly, the modified injunction
has been challenged by both sides, each arguing Chief Judge
Patel's decision regarding the injunction did not go far enough.
The Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on this issue.5 It may become
moot, however, with Chief Judge Patel's decision on the RIAA's
motion for summary judgment, argued in October 2001.16
49. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
50. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
51. Id. at 1024.
52. Having earlier disposed of Napster's fair use defenses, see supra, note
27, it went on to address its remaining defenses and rejected each one. Id. at
1026-27. As to Napster's claim that the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA"), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000), protects its activities, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the AHRA "does not cover the downloading of MP3
files to computer hard drives" because computers are not digital audio re-
cording devices and do not make digital music recordings. Napster II, 239
F.3d at 1024. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Napster's waiver, implied i-
cense and misuse defenses. See id. at 1026. It left for further development at
trial the possibility that the DMCA might provide a safe harbor from liability.
See id. at 1025.
53. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1027.
54. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-5183 MHP, C 00-
1369 MHP, 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
55. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 01-15998 (9th Cir. Dec. 10,
2001). See also Appeals Court Hears Arguments in Napster Case, SILICON
VALLEY.COM (Dec. 10, 2001), at http'J/www.siliconvalley.com.
56. As of the date of this writing, no decision has been issued. Rather, as
discussed in note 6, supra, the case has taken an interesting turn of events,
with the record companies suddenly on the defensive. See also Reuters, Nap-
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III. HYPOTHETICAL
Suppose that a Napster-like file-sharing service is launched
by a French company named Robin des Bois, S.A. ("Robin des
Bois"). The instructions on its website are written in French,
but, because it wishes to succeed against its competitors and to
ensure a wider user base, it also features instructions in Eng-
lish, the language spoken most throughout the Western world.57
As part of its service, Robin des Bois, like Napster, requires its
users to register with the company and keeps a central index of
all the songs its users have stored on their individual hard
drives. Robin des Bois' central index reflects music from
around the world, including the ever popular American music
ster, Labels Head Back to Court Wednesday, SILICON VALLEY.COM (Oct. 7,
2001), available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/reuters-wir/
15489851.htm; Reuters, Napster, Music Industry Return to Court, CNET
NEws.coM (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://news/cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-
7445627.html. Helping to make the case go away is Dr. Dre and Metallica's
summer settlement with Napster. See Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit Is Sick of
Hearing Napster Tune, RECORDER (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.law.com. Napster has also settled with music publishers and
songwriters for $26,000,000, plus portions of future profits. See Napster Set-
tles with Music Publishers, WALL ST. J., Sep. 25, 2001, at B4.
57. Another compelling reason for Robin des Bois to put English on its
website is that it will be filling Napster's shoes while it remains in litigation.
Jupiter Media Metrix has recently reported that the level of Internet file-
sharing activity in Europe has dropped by 50% since February 2001. In part,
this drop may be attributed to the fact that the majority of European users of
file-sharing sites were using Napster, which has been disabled since July
2001. See Bernhard Warner, Study: Online Song-Swapping on Decline in
Europe, SILICON VALLEY.COM (Oct. 29, 2001), at http://www.siliconvalley.com
docs/news/reuterswire/1608987 1.htm.
On the other hand, the European on-line music market may soon ex-
perience a rise in file-sharing activity. Vitaminic, Europe's largest on-line
distributor delivering files in the MP3 format, has recently signed a licensing
deal with Napster that will give it access to thousands of independent artists.
See EMI Has No Fears, supra note 7. While Vitaminic is a legitimate
subscription service, the increased awareness and availability of popular
music on the Internet in Europe may spark the flourishing of illegitimate
music pirates. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Napster Rivals Winning Popularity
Contest, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 5, 2001), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1005-200-7788007.html (expanded range of content and interest in file
sharing on the rise worldwide). In the United States, no decline has followed
Napster's temporary demise. File-sharing activity has jumped by 480% since
June 2001. See id. (Webnoise study reports number of music files download
using Kazaa, MusicCity and Grokster up 20%).
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that is copyrighted under the United States Copyright Act 8
and owned by American recording labels, among them, RIAA
member A&M Records, Inc. ("A&M"). Unlike Napster, Robin
des Bois does not reserve the right to police its site, although it
is capable of blocking access to its site by its users. All of Robin
des Bois' other features, and the way its system functions, are
not materially different from that of Napster. Most impor-
tantly, like its namesake, Robin des Bois has no intention of
charging for its service, and no intention of paying for the mu-
sic available through it. In short, Robin des Bois is not author-
ized by A&M to distribute its repertoire.
Now suppose A&M, cognizant of the Napster decision, con-
tacts Robin des Bois and informs it that A&M's music is in-
dexed on its website, and demands that it "cease and desist"
from offering A&M's copyrighted works for distribution. After
some time, having heard no response from the French com-
pany, A&M brings suit against Robin des Bois in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,
where the court is well versed in the file-sharing phenomenon,
and Napster is controlling precedent.5 9 A&M charges that its
copyrighted music is being copied and distributed via Robin des
Bois' peer-to-peer file-sharing service within the United States
and abroad, and accuses Robin des Bois of contributory in-
58. CA, 17 U.S.C. §106 (2000).
59. This hypothetical assumes that the copyrighted works at issue are
properly registered with the United States Copyright Office, thereby obviat-
ing a lengthy choice of law analysis. Had the copyright at issue been foreign,
our district court would likely be obliged to proceed with determining which
country's laws should apply to the dispute. See William F. Patry, Choice of
Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 385 (2000) (dis-
cussing choice of law issues and, in addition, concluding that no choice of law
issues will exist where an unauthorized copy of a work is placed on a website
outside of the U.S., even when subsequent infringing copying occurs in the
U.S. because no cause of action will lie). For a case demonstrating the choice
of law problems inherent in international copyright disputes, see National
Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1831, 1834 (W.D. Pa.
2000) (dispute regarding whether U.S. or Canadian law governed copyright
infringement case where defendant claimed that redistribution of U.S. pro-
gramming in Canada was not unlawful in Canada, but where the activity
would be unlawful in the U.S.). See also Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel
Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright
Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 1, 41-44 (analyz-
ing TVRadioNow).
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fringement, seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction
against the company. Robin des Bois, in turn, responds to the
allegation by bringing a motion to dismiss the complaint based
on lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction,"0 and in the
alternative, for failure to state a claim.6'
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction or the Extraterritorial Reach of
the Copyright Act
It is appropriate to acknowledge that, although the Internet
is still a fairly new technology, the answers to most questions
borne out of its novelty lie in traditional, well-developed and
much tested principles of law.62 To begin the analysis, then,
one must determine whether a U.S. district court may exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant accused of being a con-
tributory infringer via the Internet.63 This calls for an exami-
nation of the extraterritorial reach of the Copyright Act.64
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)-(2) (motions to dismiss for subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, respectively).
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
62. This sentiment is common throughout the diverse spectrum of the
legal community. To wit, Judge Jed Rakoff of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York boldly began one of his first opinions in UMG
Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., a copyright infringement case initiated by the
RIAA against now-infamous MP3.com, with the following: "The complex mar-
vels of cyberspatial communication may create difficult legal issues; but not
in this case. Defendant's infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights is clear." UMG
Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Simi-
larly, the California Court of Appeals, Sixth District, recently wrote that "as a
mode of communication and a system of information delivery [the Internet] is
new, but the rules governing the protection of property rights, and how that
protection may be enforced under the new technology, need not be." Pavlovich
v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
This sentiment was echoed in academia by Joseph H. Sommer, Coun-
sel for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in the Berkeley Technology
Law Journal: "[Clyberspace is just another battleground for some very old
wars." Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145,
1149 (2000). Sommer expounded on his proposition later when he observed
that "copyright has always been mediated through the First Amendment and
the needs of the copyright industries. We do not have a 'law of the printing
press,' or a 'law of the player piano." Id. at 1155 (citing White-Smith Music
Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
63. The Internet, unlike most applications, defies national boundaries.
For example, messages among computers are often transmitted through
"'packet switching' communication protocols," which allow individual mes-
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It is generally accepted that under 28 U.S.C. § 1338,65 district
courts of the United States do not have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over actions for infringement of U.S. copyright occurring
sages to be split up and sent along independent routes (via phone lines or
fiber-optic cables or satellites) to a single destination in which the message is
reassembled. See Dennis T. Rice, 2001: A Cyberspace Odyssey Through U.S.
and E. U. Internet Jurisdiction Over E-Commerce, in FIFTH ANNUAL INTERNET
LAW INSTITUTE 421, 445-46 (PLI Intell. Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-
661, 2001). Websites may be interconnected by way of "hyperlinks," regard-
less of the locations of their servers. See id. And, especially in the realm of
copyrighted music, users simply do not care whether they are downloading
from the United States or Germany - or whether they are uploading to Tibet
or Bali.
64. See CA, 17 U.S.C § 106 (2000). Strictly speaking, there is a distinction
between an analysis of the extraterritorial reach of a statute and subject
matter jurisdiction. To obtain subject matter jurisdiction, ordinarily one
must show that he is proceeding either under diversity jurisdiction or is seek-
ing adjudication of a federal question. Litigation under the Copyright Act
presents a federal question. The right to copyright protection is derived from
none other than the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The Copyright Act, being an act of Congress, is a federal statute. Therefore,
federal courts clearly have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a copyright
infringement claim. However, the scope of the Copyright Act will dictate
whether a claim may be brought under it. If a claim is outside the scope of
the statute, a litigant cannot avail himself of the statute's prescriptions and a
court will be unable to render a decision pursuant to that statute. Courts
sometimes refer to this analysis of the extraterritorial reach of the Copyright
Act as the analysis of subject matter jurisdiction. For the purposes of this
Article, the two concepts will be used interchangeably.
65. Section 1338 states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant
variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety
protection and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant va-
riety protection or trademark laws.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) apply to exclusive rights in mask works
under chapter 9 of title 17, and to exclusive rights in designs under
chapter 3 of title 17, to the same extent as such subsections apply to
copyrights.
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
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outside the United States.66 On the other hand, American
courts have taken jurisdiction over claims where the conduct
complained of was foreign but was clearly intended to, and did,
have an effect in the United States. Importantly, in those
cases, the courts exercised subject matter jurisdiction over acts
of contributory and vicarious infringement where those acts
66. See Quantitative Fin. Software, Ltd. v. Infinity Fin. Tech. Inc., 47
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1764, 1765 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). An exception to this rule, "when the
type of infringement permits further reproduction abroad - such as the unau-
thorized manufacture of copyrighted material in the United States... the act
taking place in the United States at the very least must itself violate the
Copyright Act." Id. at 1765. See also Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters
Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting recovery
against defendant who first copied and transmitted unauthorized work in the
U.S. and then transmitted it abroad); Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen.
Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995); Netanel, supra note 13, at
58.
Therefore, where an Israeli plaintiff sued an American corporation for
infringement of an Israeli copyright, and where the development of the
American corporation's product, which worked in tandem with the plaintiff's
product, took place overseas and was sold to a Turkish corporation for use in
trading on a U.S. exchange, the court held that it had no subject matter ju-
risdiction over plaintiffs claim. See Quantitative Fin. Software, 41 U.S.P.Q.
2d at 1766. The court explained that:
[Tihe fact that a trade [accomplished with the aid of defendant's and
plaintiffs product] takes place in the United States does not mean
that infringement, i.e., a violation of one of the exclusive rights of the
owner of copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 106, occurred in the United States,
just because the foreign party to the trade may be using, in its com-
puter program, information in which plaintiff has a copyright.
Id. This "Lex Protectionis" rule is in contrast to the recent recommendations
of the European Commission, which advances the "country of origin" theory
in its Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Soci-
ety. See Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society: Green
Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(95)382 final; Don
Beiderman, Copyright Trends: With Friends Like These..., 17 ENT. & SPORTS
LAW 3, 7 (1999). For a further discussion of choice of law issues in the context
of international copyright disputes, see Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws
and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement
Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1999).
67. The RESTATEMENT discusses the limits of a country's authority to exer-
cise jurisdiction over activities of non-residents. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1986). There must first
be: (1) jurisdiction to prescribe; (2) jurisdiction to adjudicate; and (3) jurisdic-
tion to enforce. See id.; see also Rice, supra note 63, at 431.
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provided the means by which direct infringement occurred in
the United States. '
In GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH &
Co.,69 the District Court for the Western District of New York
addressed the extraterritorial reach of the Copyright Act
through its analysis of subject matter jurisdiction.0 Plaintiff
claimed that a German company had contributed to the in-
fringement of its copyrights by affixing, abroad, copyrighted
labels that it had no authority to use, on water bottles that
were marketed and sold in America."' Defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the
Copyright Act did not reach its activities abroad.72 The district
court, noting that defendant was alleged to have sold the in-
fringing bottles to a third party with the "knowledge and intent
that the water would then be exported to the United States and
sold here," went on to find that it had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the claim. 3 The court further found, using reasoning
reminiscent of the "effects test" used to determine personal ju-
risdiction over foreign defendants,74 that it would be fair to ad-
judicate the claim against it because its acts, done abroad, "are
intended to, and do, have an effect within the United States. "
Indeed, the court went on, "it is precisely because the copyright
68. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635-36
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that jurisdiction may exist over act of contributory or
vicarious infringement where subsequent act of infringement took place in
the United States); Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA)
Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 454, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that acts of contribu-
tory or vicarious infringement in Canada may provide basis for liability in the
U.S. where defendant knew or should have known that the other could be
expected to infringe); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing
Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 864 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (noting possibility that a defen-
dant acting outside the U.S. may be held liable for contributory or vicarious
infringement). For a fuller collection of cases, see also Dinwoodie, supra note
13, at 529.
69. GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.
Supp. 763 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
70. Id. at 772.
71 Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 773.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1965) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
75. GB Marketing, 782 F. Supp. at 773.
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statues are aimed at infringement in the United States that
the court must also consider the location of the effect of [defen-
dant's] alleged action, i.e., the location of the ultimate direct
infringement."6
Similarly, in Metzke v. May Department Stores Co.,77 an
American plaintiff, Ms. Metzke, sued her distributor for vicari-
ous and contributory infringement of her copyrighted pewter
potpourri jars.78 The distributor, May Department Stores Co.
("May"), had offices in Taiwan which coordinated May's Tai-
wanese vendors and negotiated contracts between the corpo-
rate division of May ("MMC") and those vendors. 79 MMC, in
turn, served as a "conduit" for May's retail division for products
manufactured outside of the United States, and all imported
goods for May's retail division were purchased through MMCY
MMC had arranged for a Taiwanese company to copy Ms.
Metzke's original copyrighted works for May stores, but the
"knock-offs" found their way to non-May distributors in the
U.S. and were sold here. 1 On the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgement, the district court found that no claim for vi-
carious infringement may lie because plaintiff could not prove
the first element of the claim, namely that the defendant had
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity of an-
other.82
As to contributory infringement, however, the court denied
defendant's motion. In so doing, the court addressed defen-
dant's argument that, because the direct infringement of the
jars occurred in Taiwan, and is thus not actionable under the
Copyright Act, there can be no contributory infringement.83
The court agreed that since U.S. copyright law generally does
not have extraterritorial effect, May could not be held liable for
the direct infringement of the jars. 4 However, the court held
76. Id.
77. Metzke v. May Dep't Stores Co., 878 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
78. Id. at 758.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 760.
82. Id. For similar reasons, Robin des Bois would likely escape liability
for vicarious infringement.
83. Metzke, 878 F. Supp. at 760.
84. Id.
400 [Vol. XXVI:2
JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE
that May could be liable, "if it knew or should have known that
[the direct infringer's] copies of Ms. Metzke's designs would be
distributed by non-May retailers in the United States."85 The
court disposed of May's argument that it could not have known
that non-May stores would sell the products because it did not
so intend by calling the reasoning a "non sequitur."86 Having
found that its part in plaintiff's injury was actionable under the
Copyright Act, the defendant was obliged to face adjudication
in the United States.'
In much the same way, our federal court in California would
likely reach the same conclusion against Robin des Bois, at
least as to its contribution to infringing activity within the
U.S.' With the aid of precedent set by Napster, the court
would reason that the very nature of Robin des Bois' business
implies that it "knew or should have known" that its activities
would lead to direct infringement of plaintiff's copyrights in the
United States. The success of its business, much like Nap-
ster's, will have depended on its widespread popularity.89
Moreover, the case would be an easier one than Metzke, be-
cause the infringing activity would come subsequent to its fa-
cilitation, not before, and would indeed be encouraged by the
file-sharing service. Robin des Bois could not claim it was sur-
prised that its service ended up in the hands of unintended
consumers, as by design, its populist service has no unintended
consumers. Indeed, as the GB Marketing court observed, Robin
des Bois' purposeful injection of its service into the American
85. Id. at 761 (citing 3 DAViD NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHTS § 12.04[AI [21 [b] (1994)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 762.
88. As noted above, the district court would likely dismiss the claims of
contributory infringement, where the predicate act of direct infringement
takes place abroad, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to
state a claim under the Copyright Act. See Armstrong v. Virgin Records,
Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
89. The district court would certainly engage in fact finding regarding
Robin des Bois' intention to market to an American consumer base. Where
jurisdictional and substantive issues intertwine, "the question of jurisdiction
is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits." ITSI T.V.
Prod., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D.
Cal. 1992). That analysis, though equally pertinent to the discussion of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, overlaps with the inquiry into the court's personal
jurisdiction and is discussed below in that context.
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market would make its argument that the Copyright Act does
not extend to its facilitating activities unavailing."0
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The defendant in Metzke was based in the U.S., and did not
raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.9 Therefore,
the issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction having been
decided, no defense of lack of personal jurisdiction was raised.
Robin des Bois, however, is a French company, and it will
surely assert that, even if its activities are actionable under the
Copyright Act, the District Court for the Northern District of
California cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it.
As no specific federal statute governs personal jurisdiction
under the Copyright Act, courts look to the long-arm statute of
the state in which they sit.92 The California long-arm statute is
typical of long-arm statutes in other states that render jurisdic-
tion coextensive with the outer limits of due process.93 There-
fore, to survive due process scrutiny, the exercise of jurisdiction
must "not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.0'94 Put another way, the defendant's activities must
be such that he "should reasonably anticipate being hauled into
court in the United States."
There are two types of personal jurisdiction over a defendant:
general and specific.96 General jurisdiction exists where a de-
fendant's activities in the state, regardless of whether they are
related to the cause of action, are "substantial" or "continuous
and systematic."97 In all likelihood, foreign companies impli-
cated in our hypothetical would not be subject to general juris-
90. See GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co.,
782 F. Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
91. Metzke, 878 F. Supp. at 758.
92. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 454, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
93. See CAL. CODE CIv. P. § 410.10 ("A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States."). See also Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587
(9th Cir. 1993).
94. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quot-
ing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
95. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
96. See Rano, 987 F.2d at 587.
97. See id.
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diction here.98 Therefore, this analysis focuses on specific juris-
diction. Specific jurisdiction lies when: (1) the foreign defen-
dant performs an act by which he purposefully avails himself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum; (2) the claim
arises out of or results from the defendant's forum related ac-
tivities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.9 An-
other way to frame the first inquiry is to ask whether the de-
fendant purposefully directs his activity into the forum.0 ° If he
has, he has invoked that forum's protection and should rea-
sonably expect to defend himself there.1 ' In the context of
torts, the effects test, though less often applied to intellectual
property disputes, is perfectly appropriate to utilize as well."0 2
Under the effects test, the due process clause will not be of-
fended and a court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant
if he caused an effect in the forum by an act done elsewhere
that is related to the plaintiffs cause of action.0 3
For the most part, cases adjudicating whether jurisdiction
can lie over a defendant residing outside the forum state who
utilizes the Internet to conduct its business have been brought
pursuant to the Lanham Act... in the context of domain name
trademarks disputes.' Because of the unique nature of the
98. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984) (finding that personal jurisdiction exists when there are sufficient
contacts between the foreign corporation and the forum state or where the
cause of action arises out of that corporation's activities). See also Rice, supra
note 63, at 436 (general jurisdiction has been accorded less attention in Inter-
net related cases).
99. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997);
Rano, 987 F.2d at 588; Zippo Mfr. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1122-23 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
100. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417.
101 See id. at 416-17.
102. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420 (rejecting defendants arguments on the
facts); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir.
1993); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal.
1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 74, § 37 (jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant does not offend due process if he caused an effect in the forum by
an act done elsewhere that is related to the plaintiffs cause of action).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 74, § 37.
104. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000) (popularly
known as the Latham Act).
105. See infra note 114.
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tort of contributory infringement, these cases are therefore of
limited utility to this analysis. Nonetheless, they are instruc-
tive because our court will take guidance from them, thus, sev-
eral cases are discussed below.
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.'°6 is consid-
ered by courts and commentators alike to be the first to lay out
a comprehensive analytical framework to test personal juris-
diction based on Internet activity."7 In Zippo, Judge McLaugh-
lin analyzed a California corporation's contacts with the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania in order to determine whether spe-
cific personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant."8 After
setting out the traditional rules for determining jurisdiction,
established by International Shoe Co. v. Washington,0 9 Hanson
v. Denckla,"° World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,"' Helicop-
teros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.. and Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,"' the court took guidance from several
cases dealing with jurisdiction over Internet-based compa-
nies.14 The court noted that, while "the cases are scant," their
106. Zippo Mfr. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
107. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419; Rice, supra note 63, at 464.
108. Plaintiffs in Zippo conceded that the court did not have general juris-
diction over the defendant. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
109. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
110. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
111. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
112. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984).
113. Burger King Corp. v. Rudezewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
114. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-25
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,
1266-67 (6th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff purposefully directed business activities to
forum state by knowingly entering into contract there and deliberately and
repeatedly transmitting files into forum state)); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (jurisdiction found where there
was active solicitation and promotional activity to develop mailing list for
upcoming Internet service); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp.
161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (advertising on website accessible in plaintiffs fo-
rum was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in part because continuous nature of
Internet advertising may be characterized as "repetitive" for purposes of sat-
isfying Connecticut long arm statute); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (no jurisdiction where non-interactive
website merely available outside defendant's jurisdiction); Pre-Kap, Inc. v.
System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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review warranted the conclusion that "the likelihood that per-
sonal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity
that an entity conducts over the Internet."115 The court went on
1994) (no jurisdiction over consumer of services on the Internet where the
consumer is not soliciting or marketing products). Among these cases, Inset
has been most thoroughly criticized as an example of the outer limit of juris-
dictional analysis. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 63, at 462-63 (providing a com-
prehensive survey of cases dealing with personal jurisdiction over companies
utilizing the Internet).
115. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of
the Zippo opinion, albeit one that is beyond the focus of this Article, is the
court's response to the defendant's contention that its contacts with Pennsyl-
vania were not unlike the defendant's in World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at
1126-27. In the seminal case of World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court
determined that the defendant's contacts with the forum state were "fortui-
tous." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. In that case, a couple who
purchased a car in New York were injured while driving through the State of
Oklahoma and brought suit there. Id. at 288. The manufacturer of the vehi-
cle did not sell its vehicles in Oklahoma and had not attempted to establish
its business there. Id. at 295.
Defendant in Zippo argued that its contacts with Pennsylvania were
similarly "fortuitous" because a Pennsylvania resident happened upon its
website. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126. In rejecting defendant's argument, the
court, in dicta, posited that:
Dot Coin's [defendant's] contacts with Pennsylvania would be fortui-
tous within the meaning of World-Wide Volkswagen if it had no
Pennsylvania subscribers and an Ohio subscriber forwarded a copy
of a file he obtained from Dot Coin to a friend in Pennsylvania or an
Ohio subscriber brought his computer along on a trip to Pennsyl-
vania and used it to access Dot Coin's service.
Id. It is not unlikely that this is precisely the type of argument that would be
made by a true peer-to-peer Internet music service. Unlike Napster, true
peer-to-peer applications do not need the aid of a central server to enable
personal computers ("PCs") to link together. See, e.g., Rocky Road, supra note
7 (For MusicCity, Kazaa and all the Gnutella-based companies such as
LimeWire LLC, and BearShare, central servers do not make connections
between PCs on the network - rather, PCs are themselves "deputized on the
fly to play temporary roles as network traffic cops.").
Commentators have observed that the removal of the central server
from the peer-to-peer infrastructure may insulate developers of such applica-
tions from litigation because, unlike Napster, no centralized list of copy-
righted files is maintained by the developer, and no direct assistance is pro-
vided to the unauthorized trading of copyrighted works. See Bailey, supra
note 4, at 473, 476, 481 & 516 (pure peer-to-peer services leave only individu-
als as defendants - there is no "Gnutella, Inc.," just hackers who derive no
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to determine, based on this guiding principle, that personal
jurisdiction is proper over a defendant entering into contracts
with residents of the forum jurisdiction "that involve the know-
ing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Inter-
net."".6  Conversely, "a passive website that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in
it" is not amenable to jurisdiction."7  Somewhere in between
the two ends of the spectrum are "interactive Web sites where
a user can exchange information with the host computer. In
these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by exam-
ining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the
exchange of information [occurring on the site]."8 Ultimately,
the Zippo court determined that the defendant was conducting
financial gains from putting the Gnutella program on the Internet). Bailey's
suggestion that only criminal sanctions will be effective against peer-to-peer
originators may shortly be tested in the international arena. See id.
The Council of Europe Ministers' Deputies have recently announced
their approval of the Convention on Cybercrime. See Press Release, Council
of Europe, First International Treaty to Combat Crime in Cyberspace Ap-
proved by Ministers' Deputies (Sept. 19, 2001), available at
http://press.coe.intcp/2001/646a(2001).htm [hereinafter Press Release]. The
Convention, scheduled to be open for signature in late November 2001, will
go into force when five states, at least three of which are members of the
Council of Europe, have ratified it. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23,
2001, Europ. T.S. No. 185. According to the Council of Europe, the Conven-
tion will be the first international treaty on crimes committed in cyberspace,
dealing particularly with copyright infringement, among other pressing legal
issues created by the proliferation of the Internet. See Press Release, supra
note 115. On the other hand, however, these companies must still have some
hardware and Internet connections in order to maintain their relationships
with advertisers and distribution sources such as CNET Download.com. See
Rocky Road, supra note 7. The real question may be not whether one can
find the facilitator of the peer-to-peer infringement, but whether the facilita-
tor's activities rise to the level of actionable contribution under the Napster
formulation.
116. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (this category is understood as represent-
ing "active" websites).
117. Id. A passive website would not ordinarily provide a means by which
the accessor of the site might interact with the site. See Rice, supra note 63,
at 464. There are a collection of cases where courts refused to find jurisdic-
tion over "purely passive" websites. See JEFFREY P. CUNARD & JENNIFER B.
COPLAN, Selected Topics in eCommerce Law, in MCLE MARATHON 2000, at
445-46 (PLI N.Y. Practice Skills Course, Handbook Series No. FO-007N,
2000).
118. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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business over the Internet with Pennsylvania residents by con-
tracting with over 3,000 consumers and seven Internet access
providers to deliver news, and that the court had personal ju-
risdiction over it." 9 This active/passive/interactive analysis em-
ployed by the court has been used as an aid by subsequent
courts in determining jurisdiction.2
Taking guidance from the Zippo court, as well as decisions by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, 21 the Ninth Circuit in Cybersell, Inc.
v. Cybersell, Inc.," found that a website in Florida, which did
nothing to encourage people in Arizona (plaintiffs domicile) to
access its site, was not amenable to personal jurisdiction in a
trademark infringement case."' No "hits" were made to the
website in Arizona, save the plaintiffs own, no "800" number
was available for people from Arizona to call, and the Florida
business was mainly generated from personal contacts rather
than the Internet." The Cybersell court also rejected plaintiffs
"effects" test argument, distinguishing cases in which jurisdic-
tion was found on the facts of the case. 25
However, on the facts of our hypothetical, the effects test
would serve to keep Robin des Bois in California federal court.
Indeed, the facts for finding jurisdiction over Robin des Bois
are stronger than those of Panavision International, L.P. v.
119. Id. at 1126-27 (defendant had sold passwords to its 3,000 Pennsyl-
vania subscribers and contracted with providers to furnish its services in
Pennsylvania). The Zippo court found that it could exercise jurisdiction over
defendants under a specific provision of the Pennsylvania long arm statute
allowing for jurisdiction over non-residents who contract "to supply services
or things in this Commonwealth." Id. at 1122 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5322(a)(2) (1992)). However, the court emphasized that "even if Dot Corn's
[defendant's] conduct did not satisfy a specific provision of the statue, we
would nevertheless be authorized to exercise jurisdiction to the Tfullest extent
allowed under the Constitution of the United States." Id. (quoting 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(B) (1992)).
120. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
iAccess, Inc. v. Webcard Tech., 2002 WL 99651 (D. Utah Jan. 24, 2002).
121. The Ninth Circuit examined Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937
F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) and Compu-
Serve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
122. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
123. Id. at 419.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 420.
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Toeppen,126 where the District Court for the Central District of
California, employing the effects test, found it proper to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who merely regis-
tered a website in the name of plaintiffs business, hoping to
extort a fee from plaintiff, when and if plaintiff should decide to
take its business on-line.'27 In Panavision, the defendant did no
business through the Internet, and the court made plain that
its decision did not hinge on the analysis of Bensusan Restau-
rant Corp. v. King and CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,28 the
cases examined in Cybersell.'29 Instead, the court found that
the defendant's registration of the domain name at issue was
done "with the knowledge that the names belonged to [plaintiff]
and with the intent to interfere with [plaintiffs] business."'3 °
All that the court seemed to find pertinent was the defendant's
knowledge that his actions would cause an effect on plaintiffs
business. Robin des Bois, on the other hand, under our Nap-
ster-like facts, not only runs a business which derives a profit
from the exploitation of A&M's music, but also knows that it is
interfering with A&M's existing business.1
3
'
Similarly, the defendant's knowledge of the harm he was
causing provided the impetus in the most recent case in Cali-
fornia which used the effects test to find personal jurisdiction
over a defendant using the Internet.13 In Pavlovich v. Superior
126. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
127. Id. at 621.
128. Id. at 622. See also Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
129. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417.
130. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621.
131. See supra note 6 (discussing new Internet music distribution ventures
by major labels).
132. See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). While Pavlovich was decided on August 31, 2001, the procedural his-
tory of this case indicates that its ruling on personal jurisdiction is far from
final. Indeed, Pavlovich has been successful in convincing the Supreme
Court of California to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals on December
12, 2001. See Pavlovich v. Santa Clara County Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr.
2d 611 (Cal. 2001). See also David McGuire, DVD Crypto Defendant Appeals
to California Supreme Court, NEWSBYTES (Jan. 16, 2002), at
http://www.newsbytes.com. Arguments are expected to be heard sometime
later this year. The case has come to be called by some a "bellwether on the
issue of cyberjurisdiction." Id.
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Court, the defendant was the president of a start-up technology
company that posted decryption computer programs by misap-
propriating the trade secrets of a company specializing in digi-
tal versatile disk ("DVD") encryption technology.133 Defendant
also aimed to create an unlicensed DVD player that would use
the technology developed by his company to decrypt proprie-
tary DVD data in order to allow the unauthorized copying and
transmission of movies in the DVD format.1 4 Deposition testi-
mony revealed that defendant knew that licenses were re-
quired to use DVD technology, 35 he knew that the computer
technology industry is centered in California,136 and he knew
that California is the center of the motion picture industry.3
The court dispensed with the defendant's argument that be-
cause he did not specifically know the identity and location of
the plaintiff when he undertook his acts, he was not subject to
personal jurisdiction by holding that such specific knowledge is
not a requirement.1 38 Citing Panavision, the appellate court
noted that the "purposeful availment' requirement is satisfied
where a defendant's intentional conduct causes harmful effect
within the state." 9 The court went on to hold that it had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant because "he knew, or
should have known, that the DVD republishing and distribu-
tion activities he was illegally doing and allowing to be done
through the use of his Web site, while benefiting him, were
injuriously affecting the motion picture and computer indus-
tries in California.""
From the cases examined above, it is easy to see how the in-
quiry into whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant is quite similar to the analysis of subject matter juris-
diction. Indeed, both effects tests hinge on the defendant's
knowledge that his actions will cause negative consequences to
the plaintiff. In the context of our contributory infringement
hypothetical, this means that A&M will have to demonstrate
133. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 911.
134. See id. at 911-12.
135. See id. at 912.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 915.
138. See id. at 918.
139. See Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 915.
140. Id.
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that Robin des Bois knew, or should have known, that its ac-
tivities outside the United States would cause A&M harm.
Here again, the fact that A&M, heeding Napster, has sent
Robin des Bois notice that plaintiffs copyrighted material can
be found on Robin des Bois' website and has demanded that it
be removed, coupled with the fact that the peer-to-peer file
sharing technology was structured to allow the exchange of
copyrighted material,' will lead the court to the inescapable
conclusion that it will not offend due process to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over Robin des Bois.'
In addition, although, as stated earlier, no court has as yet
applied the Zippo continuum to copyright infringement cases,
the court would likely find that the Robin des Bois website was
active in the sense that, by virtue of its set-up, it materially
contributes to the direct infringing activity of its users. Indeed,
it would be odd at best for a court to conclude that a website
was passive, yet that it materially contributed to infringing
activity.
C. Liability
Finally, having found subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion, with the aid of the Napster precedent, our district court in
California will have no trouble issuing a preliminary injunction
against Robin des Bois.' Determining whether one causes an
effect in the plaintiffs chosen forum, for purposes of subject
matter and personal jurisdiction, is conceptually similar to de-
termining whether he "knows of and contributes to" a direct
violator's infringement.' Thus, personal jurisdiction analysis,
141. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001).
142. Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant intended to
cause an effect in his chosen forum, he must go on to show that jurisdiction
would be reasonable (the third prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry).
Practically speaking, many courts collapse the analysis of the two prongs into
one. If they go on to analyze the reasonableness prong, it is almost a foregone
conclusion that they will find the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. For this
reason, we do not take up this analysis here.
143. The preliminary injunction would not, however, be applicable outside
of the United States. For a judgment to be enforceable extraterritorially, it
must be executory and final. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
144. At least one court has distinguished the cases finding jurisdiction on
the basis that the connection between the jurisdictional inquiry and the cause
of action present in those cases was absent. In Digital Control Inc. v. Bo-
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like the analysis of subject matter jurisdiction, will converge
with the court's ultimate analysis of whether plaintiff has
shown that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction. As a prac-
tical matter, when our California district court finds that it can
take subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and that it can
also exercise personal jurisdiction over Robin des Bois, the find-
ing that plaintiffs will likely succeed in proving that Robin des
Bois knows that infringing material is located on its system
will be a foregone conclusion.
And because Robin des Bois functions much like Napster, in
following the Napster decision, the court will conclude that it
"materially contributed" to the infringing activity by providing
"'the site and facilities' for direct infringement."145 After all, as
in Napster, without Robin des Bois' provision of the software
(which makes file-swapping possible) and without its search
engine, servers and means of establishing a connection be-
tween users' computers, Robin des Bois' users could not find
and download the music they want with the ease the company
hopes to provide. 46
Having found that plaintiff will likely succeed on the merits,
the court will issue a preliminary injunction structured much
retronics Inc., No. C01-0074L, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14600, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 7, 2001), the court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
Minnesota defendant who allegedly infringed plaintiffs patent in transmit-
ters designed for use in remote drilling. The defendant's contacts with the
State of Washington amounted to activities that had a national scope - the
defendant advertised in two industry journals and established a website on
which it offered the product for sale. Id. at *3. It also maintained a toll free
number that could be accessed by Washington residents. Id. The court, not-
ing that no cases on point were to be found in the federal circuit, distin-
guished Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)
and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997), on the ground that "those cases ... generally involve claims that the
Internet advertisement itself infringed on a patent or trademark." Id. at *4.
The court went on to apply the "web site plus" rule where:
Until the advertiser is actually faced with and makes the choice to
dive into a particular forum, the mere existence of a worldwide web
site, regardless of whether the site is active or passive, is an insuffi-
cient basis on which to find that the advertiser has purposely di-
rected its activities at residents of the forum state.
Id. at *7.
145. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022.
146. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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like the one used in Napster. Of course, because the Copyright
Act does not have extraterritorial effect, the court will not com-
pel Robin des Bois to take down its service outside of the
United States. Nonetheless, the French company will have
been deprived of a customer base that cannot seem to get
enough free music and ultimately, of a great source of reve-
nue.'47 Without the impressive American user-base, Robin des
Bois will eventually be forced to leave the forest.
IV. CONCLUSION
To date, the issues posited by our fictitious lawsuit against
Robin des Bois remain unexamined outside of the hypothetical
analyzed in the Article. It would not be surprising, however, if
real defendants based outside the United States, such as Grok-
ster, Ltd. 4 ' Empowerment BV,4 9 or future defendants as yet
unknown, raised the defense of lack of subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction in copyright infringement lawsuits filed
against them."° It will be interesting to observe whether, on a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the theories asserted
by the litigants will be similar to the effects test discussed pre-
viously. Equally interesting will be whether, having taken ju-
risdiction over the claim, the court will extend the effects
analysis to the substantive matter of granting an injunction
against the would-be contributory infringer.
Regardless of how current litigation develops, however, it
appears clear that sooner rather than later, a Robin des Bois
type service will spring up outside U.S. borders. The issues we
raise concerning contributory copyright infringement litigation
147. A file-swapping service that is available free of charge will primarily
survive on advertising dollars. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,
92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
148. Grokster's principal place of business is Nevis, West Indies. See
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 01-8541 (C.D. Cal. filed
Oct. 2, 2001); Steven Bonisteel, If Morpheus Is Illegal, So is the Rest of the
Net-EEF, NEWSBYTES (Feb. 26, 2002), at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/
02/174778.html; supra note 8.
149. Empowerment's principal place of business is Amsterdam, The Neth-
erlands. See Grokster, No. 01-8541.
150. As of this writing, it appears that the defendants in Grokster have
chosen to attack the allegation against them on a substantive level by assert-
ing the Betamax defense. See supra note 36; Bonisteel, supra note 148.
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initiated in the U.S. against such a service will have far reach-
ing implications that will reverberate, much like the Internet
itself, on an international level. One way or the other, it seems
inevitable that they will be addressed.

